Fragile Nature of Competitive Advantage in an Analytic Driven Market by Rosenkrans, Sarah
   
Fragile Nature of Competitive 
Advantage in an Analytic Driven 
Market 
SportVU in the NBA 
                                                       
Author: Sarah Rosenkrans            
Director: Dr. Jason Kiley               
Second Reader: Dr. Bryan Finch 
Fragile Nature of Competitive Advantage in an Analytic Driven Market  
1 
 
 
Abstract 
The increase in the use of analytic measurements and technology in professional sports 
has grown and is considered to be the future of business.  The National Basketball Association 
has entered an agreement with STATS, LLC, an analytic firm, for the use of their SportVU 
technology to track games and provide data to the teams.  This advancement in technology has 
been heralded to be the break through advancement in analytics as it provides accurate and 
complex data to teams.  Through regression model testing it was displayed that teams who 
invested in the technology prior to the league wide deal did in fact gain a competitive advantage 
in the league.  However, the competitive advantage did not last due to saturation of the 
technology in the market.  While the shift of focus to analytics is still prevalent in the league the 
next step is to focus on how to integrate the data provided by SportVU in a manner that creates 
another competitive advantage.  Human capital will most likely be used to generate this 
advantage through unique insights into the overwhelming amount of data available to teams.   
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In an industry where distinct and true differentiation is hard to create, there is a push to 
create a sustainable competitive advantage by employing analytics. The National Basketball 
Association (NBA) signed a deal with STATS, LLC, a statistic and analytic firm, that installed 
cameras in each arena to track the game for analytic use by teams (Aldridge 2013).  The 
technology STATS uses is called SportVU.  It was originally created to track missiles during 
testing, but has also proven effective in tracking the performance of basketball players.  
Organizations are shifting to analytics across all different sports rather than relying on an 
“eyeball test” or simple statistics (Aldridge 2013).  The NBA is the first major league to 
implement this technology league wide.  The perceived intentions of the league were to create a 
more complete box score and elevate the game (McCann 2012).  The desire of the teams is to 
learn from the data and transform it into information that can allow their team to perform better 
and ultimately win.  Individual organizations wanted to create a competitive advantage by using 
these analytics. Prior to the league wide implementation there were several teams who partnered 
with STATS and used SportVU (McCann 2012).  While the executives from these teams are not 
named, they were upset because their team had already made the investment into SportVU and 
were upset that the league now provided everyone access to the technology and data (Aldridge 
2013).  However, they also conceded that it would be beneficial to have a full set of data league 
wide instead of the fifty percent of the season that teams got from their home games alone 
(Aldridge 2013).  The league-wide expansion proved to show that the competitive advantage 
gained by having this technology was erased as it became easily imitated and the rarity of this 
advantage was lost.  The advantage was no longer sustainable and ceased to exist but the 
opportunity to reinvigorate SportVU with the help of specialized human capital remains.   
The sporting industry is often viewed as different from other industries in the way in 
which the product is produced.  The output and performance of the team itself is not directly 
manipulated by executives and cannot be manufactured to an exact specification each and every 
year, much less every game.  This creates challenges for the organizations because there is no 
assured way to duplicate a performance.  Although there are other factors involved in selling a 
team and the organization being profitable the performance of the team is important.  Fans want 
to see their team win and that is a priority of the organization.   This is why the analytics promise 
of producing a better output is something teams hope to find viable to put together teams and 
strategic game plans to win games and win championships. 
Analytics are not only being lauded in the NBA, but also in other leagues.  The Arizona 
Coyotes of the National Hockey League (NHL) recently hired 26 year old John Chyaka as their 
new General Manager.  He founded Statletes, a firm based in Canada which analyzes film of 
players and uses those analytics to grade players and provide insight into player and team 
performance (Statletes.com 2016).  Hiring an analytics guru like Chyaka is a vote of confidence 
by the Coyotes in analytics.  The Oakland Athletics of Major League Baseball (MLB) used an 
economic approach to valuing players and have consistently been the considered the “best bang 
for your buck” team in relation between performance on the field and payroll of players (Morris 
2014).  Even the Golden State Warriors’ owners exploited the market inefficiency they found 
with the 3-point line in order to make strategic decisions in the building of their team (Cohen 
2016).  These increasingly analytical approaches are being observed in almost every major 
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league.  While stats have always been kept there is a new depth of analysis emerging on levels 
that were not previously imaginable.   
SportVU was first implemented into soccer in Europe. It was able to track the distance 
players ran and correlate this to their performance (Aldridge 2013).  The potential for team 
doctors to tell players how far they are allowed to run in a game instead of a certain number of 
minutes they are allowed to play is far more helpful to their recovery process was one of the 
major perks of SportVU (STATS.com 2016).  The scope of this technology does not simply 
reside in the win and loss columns, but in the way in which athletes recover and rehabilitate.  The 
way players run down the court and efforts for their recovery can be tracked in a more accurate 
manner (Maese 2013).  Analytics also reaches out into the valuation of players.  It allows 
coaches to evaluate how the number of touches a player has in correlation to the teams overall 
scoring and can use this information to better value a player’s efficiency in the game.  The 
general consensus is that the data being captured will be used in contract negotiations and be a 
determining factor in the contracts that players sign in the future (Aldridge 2013).   
This move toward analytics has the potential to change the way fans and professionals 
look at games (McCann 2012).  The deal the NBA made allows fans to have access to the new 
tracking statistics (Aldridge 2013).  Fans and media will have access to the stats and the hope is 
that it will assist in a better understanding of why teams make the decisions they do that moves 
beyond the basic stats that have traditionally been shown to fans (Barker 2016).  Now the media 
and fans can see the statistics that the organizations do and can enjoy them beyond the traditional 
box score that has been the standard for so long. 
SportVU was not originally created to track sports, but SportVU was developed in 2005 
by Miky Tamir, an Israeli scientist who worked for Elbit Systems.  The original purpose was to 
track the trajectory of missiles post launch to see if they were actually where they were supposed 
to be in accordance to their designs by using advanced optical recognition (McCann 2012).   
Some of the workers at Elbit Systems were soccer fans and thought that SportVU could not only 
track missiles, but also soccer players.  They were able to track how far players ran during games 
and how well they performed over the period of the game (Aldridge 2013).  They were able to 
determine if a player got tired around a certain minute due to time played or if he was tired due 
to the distance he ran.  It went beyond what was able to be analyzed and created advanced stats 
like the previously mentioned distance or even the average rate of speed or how consistent a 
speed was.  STATS, LLC bought SportVU in 2008.  During this time Brain Kopp, Vice 
President of Strategy and Development at STATS, LLC, began to think of how well it would 
work in a smaller playing field which led to basketball.  Kopp saw the potential that SportVU 
had for basketball and began selling to teams individually before striking a deal with the NBA 
(Aldridge 2013).  
The advancement of stats is already showing in the statistics SportVU provides.  
According to an ESPN article, analytics can tell who has the fastest top speed, who scores the 
most, and who scores the most per touch.  They can also analyze if a team shoots more often off 
of passes from a certain player.  For example, Celtic forward Paul Pierce was passing to his 
teammates when they had opportunities to shoot increasing the number of shots taken off of 
passes from Pierce.  They can show if a specific player scores at a higher rate when passed to by 
a certain teammate over the average (McCann 2012). Teams are hesitant to share any 
information they have on the way in which they actually use the analysis or further the analysis 
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because they want to generate a competitive advantage from this technology (McCann 2012).  
Some of the stats are simply being enhanced by this technology more so than rewriting stats.  It 
has changed the rebounds stat from looking at rebounds per game to integrating rebounding 
chances which is defined as a player being within 3.5 feet of the ball instead of the pure number 
of rebounds.  It also accounts for rebounds in traffic, which is defined as when an opposing 
player is within 3.5 feet of the ball (McCann 2012).  This shows a more definite picture of how 
good of a rebounder a player is because it takes into account how many times they actually have 
the opportunity and if they are facing competition for the rebound or if it is an “easy” rebound.  
There are also new categories of stats being created such as an “athleticism” category.  This 
category tracks how quickly players move about the court and how long it takes them to close 
out on a shooter (McCann 2012).  It changes the idea of pace as a number of possessions per 
game into an actual time the team is possessing the ball.  STATS, LLC is looking to show a more 
detailed and better story of the game through stats instead of the basic, points, assists, rebounds 
that exist right now in the box score (McCann 2012). 
In order to capture, track, compile and analyze all of this data, cameras had to be set up in 
each arena.  The system includes six cameras on the catwalks in the arenas and three on each half 
of the court.  Algorithms are programed to capture they x, y, and z positioning of objects on the 
court (Cervone 2014).  This means it is three dimensional analysis of the court.  The NBA was 
able to track to see if a goaltending call in the 2009 playoffs was correctly called and SportVU 
showed that the ball was indeed descending and the correct call was made (Aldridge 2013).  All 
of this is done at a speed of 25 pictures per second.  Once captured, they are processed by a 
computer that generates a report within 90 seconds of a play.  ICE is the proprietary algorithms 
in the software that STATS, LLC created that allows these reports to be created and almost 
immediately available to the coaches on tablets or computers (Aldridge 2013).  The basics of 
these algorithms is the creation of models that can identify different features of the game as 
passes, touches, shots, rebounds and so much more.  They are extremely complex algorithms in 
order to correctly and effectively collect all of the data that they do.  The vectors and histograms 
of frequently produced movements are created and called action recognition (Soomro 2014).  
The models are created to identify these by learning the motions, action poses, or other 
movements.  The idea of learning is when models of different movements and poses are created 
and when they attempt to match these by the programing a real person would confirm or deny if 
the algorithm correctly identified the action (Soomro 2014).  Then with enough repetition the 
algorithms are able to identify these actions based on all of the past learning.  The next level is 
called action localization which deals with the location, space, and speed of these actions.  This 
looks at the space in which actions are experienced and the time in which they occur.  
Background clutter and the actual time-space of the actions must be accounted for instead of just 
identification of said actions (Soomro 2014).  All of this allows them to track how quickly they 
travel and how many times they touch the ball.  It calculates passes in a possession and time 
dribbling.  There is so much data that is compiled it is almost too much to use at this moment, 
but that is not stopping teams from using it.  According to an ESPN article, they said executives 
were not even using 10 percent of the information the system provided, but say this is the way 
analytics in basketball is headed (McCann 2012).   
SportVU’s introduction to the NBA began in the 2009-2010 season when Kopp 
convinced the Dallas Mavericks, Houston Rockets, Oklahoma City Thunder and San Antonio 
Spurs to purchase the technology.  In the following season the Boston Celtics and Golden State 
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Warriors also implemented this technology.  By the 2011-2012 season the Milwaukee Bucks, 
Minnesota Timberwolves, New York Knicks, Toronto Raptors, and Washington Wizards joined 
the mix (McCann 2012). Then in the following season the Cleveland Cavilers, Orlando Magic, 
Philadelphia 76ers, and Phoenix Suns joined to bump the total of teams up to 15 (Cervone 2014).  
In the following year the NBA entered a partnership with STATS, LLC and it was put into place 
in every arena in the NBA for the 2013-2014 season and has been used ever since (Aldridge 
2014).   
All indications point to analytics continuing to impact the sporting industry.  But was 
SportVU a competitive advantage in the NBA marketplace?  Dr. Jason Kiley assisted me in 
running statistical analysis using Stata, a statistical analysis modeling software, in order to find 
correlation between SportVU and predictors of success in basketball.  NBAMiner.com is a 
website that has archived several categories of stats from the 1996-1997 season to the current 
2016-2017 season.  These stats range from the basic stats of wins and losses and average points 
per game to pace of the game and effective field goal percentage.  These stats are taken from the 
statistics kept by the NBA but all compiled together into one place that can be easily transferred 
to and analyzed using Stata software.  Prior to importing the excel spreadsheets into Stata that 
were exported from NBAMiner.com it required some simple cleaning to prepare the data.   
The stats from the 2008-2009 season through the 2015-2016 season were sorted 
alphabetically by team name and then a new set of data was created.  For each season, a SportVU 
variable was created.  Either a 0 or a 1 was entered for not having SportVU in that season or 
having SportVU in that season respectively.  Once this was completed, the years were compiled 
into a master spreadsheet for each category of stats NBA Miner had created.  These were as 
follows: basic stats, advanced stats, four factor stats and rare stats.   
Once all of the data was compiled and cleaned it was time to import the files into Stata.  
One final change that needed to be made once in Stata was the name change of the New Jersey 
Nets to the Brooklyn Nets in 2012-2013 season, but a simple line of code to replace “Brooklyn 
Nets” if it was “New Jersey Nets” was created to complete standardization of the data set.   
The next step was to decide what variables to look at in relation to the SportVU.  There 
were a few factors that would seem to be predictive measures of success on the court and should 
be tested against the presence of SportVU.  The three chosen were offensive efficiency, which is 
defined as the number of points scored per 100 possessions, defensive efficiency, which is 
defined as the number of points allowed per 100 possessions, and pace, which is defined as the 
number of possessions used by team per 48 minutes (DataMiner.com, 2016).  A higher offensive 
efficiency rate and a lower defensive efficiency rate would lend to better offensive and defensive 
production and pace can lend not only to the more possessions for higher chance of scoring, but 
also to the speed and entertainment of the game the higher the pace.  Also tested was the average 
home attendance. It was one of the rare statistics that seemed interesting to try and display a 
correlation between the presence of SportVU and higher attendance in a way of suggesting that 
SportVU creates or could create a more entertaining game and draw larger crowds.    
Once all of the variables were chosen and the t-tests were performed to make sure that 
there were no missing matches per year with the SportVU data, restrictions by year were made.  
Regression models were used to show correlation between these variables more specifically so 
an x-t-regression (xtreg).  An xtreg is a panel regression so it is needed because the observations 
look at team and season as a pair instead of as individuals.  It also allows for the use of lagging in 
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order to allow for all perceived variables to precede the dependent variable in time.  The prior 
season’s data for the SportVU variable was used in relation to the four variables chosen to be 
tested.  This was done to show that there has to be some lag time in the outcomes of employing 
this technology as there would not be an immediate effect from implementation of SportVU and 
success within the same season.  This data showed that it was a good predictor of pace.  That 
pace increased the years after SportVU was used by a team.  However, in this model SportVU 
only seemed to share a correlation with pace, but not offensive or defensive efficiency.  This was 
initially unexpected because the idea behind SportVU was to be able to analyze play to such an 
extreme level that having SportVU would allow for teams to use the data and analysis to make 
changes and improve the way the team plays and it was expected to have a correlation.  Even in 
such a simple modeling it appeared that there was no strong, true correlation between having 
SportVU and an improvement in performance. 
With this in mind the modeling turned into creating a three year lag command.  This 
command simply captured those teams that had SportVU for three consecutive years.  This was 
done to show the impact that it had on those who have implemented it over time and not just the 
prior year to show a more true expression of the time it takes to create a competitive advantage.  
After the modeling was showing an increase in pace, but a slightly negative correlation for 
offensive efficiency and a slightly negative correlation for defensive efficiency.  This was not 
what was expected from this regression.  As shown in this first regression table the main factor 
looked at is the SportVU variable being present and its correlation to pace.  The coefficient 
shows just over a one point increase in pace for a team has that SportVU in comparison a one 
point increase in offensive efficiency basically does not affect pace in any manner as the 
correlation is so small. 
 
pace Coef. Std. Err.          t      P>t  [95% Conf.  Interval] 
sportvu         
L1. 1.077631 0.3330482  3.24 0.003  0.3983747 1.756887 
ast         
L1. 0.1558582 0.116273  1.34 0.19  -0.0812821 0.3929985 
offeff         
L1. -0.0795107 0.0430823  1.85 0.075  -0.1673776 0.0083562 
pointplays         
L1. -0.028469 0.0806062  0.35 0.726  -0.1928664 0.1359285 
avghomeatte~e        
L1. 0.0002231 0.0001625  1.37 0.18  -0.0001083 0.0005545 
pace         
L1. 0.4752655 0.0765533  6.21 0  0.3191341 0.6313969 
_cons 49.48462 8.491804  5.83 0  32.16548 66.80377 
 
This next regression table shows the negative correlation between SportVU and offensive 
efficiency.  The negative correlation, while so minor it has almost no correlation would show 
less than a point decrease in offensive efficiency when SportVU was present in a team.  The 
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thought was that the presence of the SportVU variable would increase the offensive efficiency as 
it is a predictor of success in basketball.   
offeff Coef. Std. Err.           t         P>t  [95% Conf. Interval] 
sportvu         
L1. -0.28101 0.4894758  0.57 0.57  -1.2793 0.7172849 
ast         
L1. -0.12403 0.1593483  0.78 0.442  -0.4490253 0.2009606 
pace         
L1. -0.01839 0.1015413  0.18 0.857  -0.2254828 0.1887067 
pointplays        
L1. 0.080091 0.0954074  0.84 0.408  -0.114494 0.2746755 
avghomeatte~e        
L1. 0.000155 0.0001749  0.88 0.384  -0.0002022 0.0005112 
offeff         
L1. 0.280496 0.081685  3.43 0.002  0.1138988 0.447094 
_cons 78.53217 10.02309  7.84 0  58.08994 98.97439 
 
Defensive efficiency was negatively correlated with the SportVU which is what one 
would expect.  The negative correlation is good because the lower the defensive efficiency the 
better because it means teams are giving up less points per possession of opponents, so a 
decrease in the efficiency is actually an improvement.  As displayed in the table there is a little 
over a quarter of a point drop in defensive efficiency when the SportVU technology is in place.  
Although there is a correlation that is productive, it is still very small advantage.   
 
defeff Coef. Std. Err.          t       P>t  [95% Conf. Interval] 
sportvu         
L1. -0.29429 0.4845295  0.61 0.548  -1.282496 0.693913 
rebrate         
L1. -0.45113 0.1142463  3.95 0  -0.6841371 -0.2181233 
pace         
L1. 0.059902 0.1239366  0.48 0.632  -0.1928686 0.3126722 
blk         
L1. 0.053294 0.479762  0.11 0.912  -0.9251865 1.031775 
avghomeatte~e        
L1. 0.000279 0.0001604  1.74 0.092  -0.0000486 0.0006057 
oppto         
L1. -0.31813 0.237859  1.34 0.191  -0.8032465 0.1669869 
defeff         
L1. 0.170138 0.0866885  1.96 0.059  -0.0066643 0.3469406 
_cons 105.2568 18.91201  5.57 0  66.68548 143.8281 
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Overall, it was a surprise that the technology that is being heralded to be the best 
analytical advantage in sports was not showing correlation to improvement in performance.  
However, there was still showing the lag of three years which every team in the NBA has now 
had the technology for three seasons.  This still drew from data that had no variation for several 
seasons because every team had SportVU for a period of time.  Again, the results implied that 
having SportVU was not a competitive advantage which is in contrast to the widely held belief 
that advanced analytics and statistics are the future.     
The next step was to account for the seasons in which every team in the league had the 
technology.  The data was restricted not only with lag, but was completely restricted to the first 
six seasons of the data set.  The sixth season was the last season that not every team in the league 
had the technology.  This was done in order to eliminate the bias of the data when there is no 
difference across the teams of having or not having SportVU.  This gave the opportunity to look 
at the competitive advantage of having the technology was able to create when at least half of the 
league was not using it.  This was done by adding a simple line of code that created a condition 
to limit the data for the first six seasons only.  Once these restrictions and parameters were put 
into place offensive efficiency was up nearly a point per season that SportVU was used.  
defeff Coef. Std. Err.          t    P>t  [95% Conf. Interval] 
sportvu         
L1. -0.4325241 0.9249874  0.47 0.644  -2.324336 1.459287 
rebrate         
L1. -0.1949504 0.1895829  1.03 0.312  -0.582691 0.1927902 
pace         
L1. -0.0017417 0.1968291  0.01 0.993  -0.4043023 0.400819 
blk         
L1. -0.1967491 0.5227289  0.38 0.709  -1.26585 0.8723515 
avghomeatte~e        
L1. 0.000345 0.000289  1.19 0.242  -0.0002461 0.0009361 
oppto         
L1. -0.6095513 0.3819519  1.6 0.121  -1.390731 0.1716281 
defeff         
L1. 0.213486 0.134025  1.59 0.122  -0.0606259 0.4875978 
 
This table shows a negative correlation between the presence of the SportVU technology 
and defensive efficiency, which as previously stated is an improvement.  This is up from a 
quarter of a percent to almost a half of a point improvement in defensive efficiency per year.  
This shows that when SportVU is exclusive to many in the NBA it does correlate to better 
defensive performance and it is what you would expect when using this technology.  Next shows 
the reverse of what was observed prior to the season limitation with offensive efficiency. 
 
 
offeff        Coef. Std. Err.           t           P>t    [95% Conf. Interval] 
sportvu         
L1. 0.9198516 1.001121  0.92 0.366  -1.127671 2.967374 
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ast         
L1. -0.765607 0.2309839  3.31 0.002  -1.238022 -0.2931919 
pace         
L1. -0.0234155 0.1736913  0.13 0.894  -0.3786542 0.3318231 
pointplays         
L1. 0.0946536 0.1935065  0.49 0.628  -0.3011117 0.4904189 
avghomeatte~e        
L1. 0.0002987 0.0003033  0.98 0.333  -0.0003216 0.0009191 
offeff         
L1. 0.1920892 0.1095344  1.75 0.09  -0.0319339 0.4161122 
 
By eliminating the data bias the competitive advantage is again seen in this regression 
table.  It shows a correlation of nearly one whole point increase in offensive efficiency per 
season with the presence of the SportVU technology.  This would lead to the inference that while 
SportVU analytics can lead to better defensive efficiency that teams who had SportVU prior to 
the league wide implementation used it to increase their offense more than their defense.  
  
pace Coef. Std. Err.          t      P>t  [95% Conf. Interval] 
sportvu         
L1. -0.2335781 0.647598  0.36 0.721  -1.558065 1.090908 
ast         
L1. -0.0662726 0.1836737  0.36 0.721  -0.4419275 0.3093823 
offeff         
L1. -0.0138655 0.0577626  0.24 0.812  -0.1320032 0.1042722 
pointplays         
L1. -0.0432916 0.1016808  0.43 0.673  -0.2512521 0.1646689 
avghomeatte~e         
L1. -0.0000807 0.0001436  0.56 0.578  -0.0003744 0.000213 
pace         
L1. 0.3297545 0.1107132  2.98 0.006  0.1033207 0.5561883 
  
The correlation between pace and the presence of SportVU is negative.  It is a very small 
correlation and does not show that teams actually slowed their game down or had less 
possessions per game each season, but that they were not increasing their possessions at the same 
rate as those teams that did not have SportVU.  It could be attributed that slowing down the game 
and taking less possessions, but better possessions were the case or that they were slowing down 
their opponents as well.  It is a small correlation, but still shows a slower increase in pace. 
These regression models show the potential of the competitive advantage that was gained 
by teams that implemented SportVU.  Before the NBA struck a deal with STATS, LLC and the 
technology was league wide there was in fact a competitive advantage.  These results imply that 
the time when everyone had SportVU created the effect competitive advantage was wiped out 
because the aspects of rarity and the difficulty to imitate or substitute for SportVU were lost and 
therefore, while it may still be valuable the competitive advantage was lost.   
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Very few regression models showed the significance that would usually be required to 
count the correlation as a legitimate correlation.  However, because the data is historical and a 
complete data set from the league and the whole league instead of a sample of the whole 
population the lack of significance can be disregarded.  This is only because the entire data set is 
included and analyzed not just a sample to model a much larger and incomplete data set.  After 
the progression to get to these regressions that look at those with SportVU while others do not 
have SportVU it appears that having SportVU is in fact a competitive advantage.  It is valuable 
as it shows a correlation between higher offensive efficiency and lower defensive efficiency.  
Showing these correlations shows the value it has through the benefits it provides in performance 
of the team.  The increase in offensive efficiency and decrease in defensive efficiency are the 
basis of the value attached to the competitive advantage.  Both appear to be helped by the 
presence of SportVU.   
The components that create and sustain a competitive advantage are value, rarity, 
difficulty to imitate and difficulty to substitute.  The value is displayed in the correlations that 
show improved offensive and defensive efficiency.  This is not to say that there is still not value 
to SportVU after everyone used it.  Not only did it have value, but SportVU also was rare, in the 
first season it was introduced only four teams had it and on half of the league had it before it was 
implemented league wide.  The rarity allowed it to be a competitive advantage because it was not 
widely available to all in the marketplace.  In the first six seasons of the data set it proved to be 
rare and that was a factor in why SportVU was a competitive advantage in that time.  SportVU 
was also not easily substitutable as no one else had the same type of analytical power and data 
capture the SportVU provided.  This analysis it provided was far beyond the stats that were 
formerly and still are used.  There was nothing of the sort to substitute for it.  There were no 
products that could provide the level of analytics.  For the first few years no one could imitate 
what SportVU did for the teams, it took the adoption of the same technology to wash out the 
advantage. There was no other technology or company doing anything close to what SportVU 
was providing to these teams, there was no imitation of the technology.  Then when the 
technology was adopted by the entire NBA the rarity, substitution, and imitation factors were 
removed.  This is what created the destruction of any competitive advantage that SportVU once 
provided.  The only that remained was the argument of value.  Once SportVU was no longer 
difficult to imitate and cost that money for teams that only select teams decided to pay and the 
NBA stepped in to provide it for everyone the competitive advantage was forfeited. 
This leads to the idea that the NBA is currently in an arms race to find the “next best 
thing” to create a competitive advantage and hold onto it as long as possible.  This does not mean 
that teams should not use SportVU to its full potential, even though it appears that the full 
potential is a long way off.  It simply means that innovations will continually enter the 
marketplace and that teams will continually have to assess if they think they can capitalize on the 
advantage and keep it rare, valuable, not easily imitated or substituted.  
It does not lend to the idea that analytics are not the future or that they do not help teams.  
This notion would be false in the way it did show correlation to improvement.  SportVU has 
become a necessity teams must use in order to even have a chance to compete in the NBA.  It is 
the new baseline because without it teams would be behind the curve of where analytics is going.  
While the general trend still leads to analytics it is now about how to use these analytics to beat 
the competition by creating something that will be a competitive advantage once again.  The 
movement towards analytics is believed to be the future by NBA executives (McCann 2012).  
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However now that SportVU has lost its competitive advantage it’s a race to see which teams can 
capitalize on the next use of SportVU or the next technology and attempt to maintain the 
competitive advantage before it becomes an arms race again.  The biggest obstacle may be the 
lack of understanding.  A decision on what factors to look at in order for coaches to improve 
their teams performance or evaluate who to draft or trade for or even if the volume of data can be 
sifted through and comprehended in a manner that is helpful is the dilemma (Steinberg 2015). 
It falls back onto the human capital of those working with the analysis. Teams must try to 
outplay their opponent like a game of chess and strategize what course to take that will best 
benefit them.  As previously stated executives said they only use around ten percent of the 
analytics that they can at this point (McCann 2012).  This leaves room for differentiation and 
strategy to grow out of SportVU and not render it obsolete.  Each organization must find the 
right people to hire in order to make sense of the overwhelming amount of data.  Teams will 
need to find computer programmers and stats personnel and spreadsheet analysts that understand 
the game, but can make the data into sense for the coaches and staff and can in turn be acted on 
(Lowe, 2013).   Spreadsheet experts alone can no longer create a difference as the data has now 
become so advanced that statistical programming and computer science are now required to 
derive value from the data (Alamar, 2015).  The people who decipher this data into meaningful 
concepts and ideas are arguably the most important part to successfully using the data.  Prior to 
the introduction of SportVU some teams did contract work for analytic help.  The Oklahoma 
City Thunder, Seattle Super Sonics at the time, hired Ben Alamar to provide his analytic 
expertise prior to the 2008 Draft, and beyond, in which he was met with some skepticism as he 
was one of the first “analytic guys” to be hired by an NBA team (Alamar, 2015).  Since then 
more teams have hired consultants and implemented analytics into their operations.  However, it 
was not a seamless transition or marriage of traditional scouting and analytics on those being 
scouted.  Alamar noted a time when he was watching film and presented an argument in favor of 
Johnny Flynn being a good defender due to a high rate of steals but was countered by the 
traditional basketball knowledge of a scout that zone defense was likely the probable cause for 
this (Alamar, 2015).  There is no value in the use of SportVU unless the marriage between the 
analytics and stats are met with the traditional intuition and knowledge of the game itself.  Dan 
Cervone, Alexander D’Amour, Luke Bornn, and Kirk Goldsberry of the Department of Statistics 
and Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University did research on how to use 
the SportVU data to value the decisions players make (Cervone 2014).  They created the 
expected possession value (EVP) in order to analyze decisions throughout the game instead of 
simply assists and scores of turnovers.  It utilizes the SportVU data that captures all of the 
movements and ranks different situations like passing to open players or taking a shot under 
duress or not (Cervone 2014).  This allows for valuation of decisions made even if the play does 
not result in points.  Not only does it look at the basics of basketball, like passing to an open 
player rather than a guarded player being a better choice, but the differences in how good players 
are more so in their ability to shoot above average (Cervone 2014).  Research and 
implementation of the data like this is a step in the direction that teams will go.  While EVP may 
not be the direction that every team goes and is not fully developed due to the fact only half of 
the teams in the league used SportVU at this point does lend to a possible result of the data 
captured.  Understanding what the coaches want out of the data and then extracting that 
information for the coaches and then transferring that knowledge in a meaningful way is the key.  
The data appears to be so overwhelming it is not to be taken lightly the knowledge and 
experience needed to understand and properly manipulate the data.  Linking the data to the sport 
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itself may end up being the biggest obstacle in order to use the technology to its full potential.  
Teams may begin to look into their division and try to predict what their opponents will do.  Will 
teams begin building outside shooting teams only and cause a cyclical effect for others to build a 
team with a good distributer and big inside men to dominate the paint?  Will teams go to try and 
create an extremely balanced team and try to win on the margins?  The strategic step will differ 
between teams if teams decide to lean towards a more defensive appearance as a team or if they 
continue to push on offense and try to out-score all their opponents.   Humans make the 
difference and call the shots.  Even with all of the data in the world, it comes down to the “stat 
guys” and programmers and analysts successfully translating the data into manageable results for 
coaches and executives to aid in their decision making process.      
Some teams will be reluctant to make the changes or may not see the changes 
immediately (Lowe, 2013).  While others were looking into analytics before the NBA made the 
deal with SportVU.  Toronto was looking at analytics (Aldridge 2013) and Oklahoma City had 
pre-draft analysis in 2008 before teams even had SportVU (Alamar 2015).  The opportunities are 
out there to find the top grade analysts and programmers to employ, but as Alamar noted these 
positions pay about half of the salary that they could get going to work on Wall Street or another 
firm (Alamar 2015).  Until teams take the position seriously and offer competitive pay for these 
positions there will be a lack of results from the data.  Without top tier talent and skills to make 
the copious amounts of data meaningful the overall results will not reflect the potential that the 
SportVU data has to provide.  Without the correct human capital the data is meaningless to 
teams.  One thought is that teams may look to firms with more experience in data analysis over 
hiring people full time into the organization.  Based on the recent trends of paying far below 
what these analysts could get elsewhere the likelihood of teams going to outside firms and 
paying the going market rate is not likely. 
Gambling on sports has been a reality and could potentially change with the new stats 
available to the public.  Currently there does not appear to be any bets that would require these 
stats to be used in order to place the bet or determine the outcome.  Most are still who scores 
first, which team scores more in a quarter, or first team to a certain point total (Bovada 2016).  
These do not need the advanced stats such as something odd as if a team will have a higher 
shooting percentage off of Durant or Curry passes.  However, in the trend from betting with 
bookies and in Las Vegas to daily or weekly fantasy betting on sites FanDuel or DraftKings there 
could be a small trend to smaller prop bets moving in this direction as fans gain a better 
understanding of the new stats they are seeing.   
The varying directions in which teams can go with their strategy epitomizes the 
opposition to standardization in the sport industry.  It cannot become like a manufacturing plant 
that creates the same output every time.  The Sporting industry so much more human capital 
driven than other industry and it lies not only in the players on the court, but those who decide 
who is on each team and those who decide how to use their talents.  Analytics do lead to 
improvement, but instead of the technology used for analytics it is the use of these analytics are 
what create the ever fleeting competitive advantage.  Analytics is the future of many leagues 
including the NBA, but most will most likely be the same as SportVU: a short lived competitive 
advantage that is shortly washed away once it loses one of the elements that makes is a true 
competitive advantage until human capital is implemented to rejuvenate the technology.   
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